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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN S. GOELTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL BANK AND · 
TRUST COMPANY 
Defendent. 
Case No. 8408 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of 
Marion S. Goeltz and against The Continental Bank 
and Trust Company for the return by the said Bank 
to said Marian S. Goeltz of 12 shares of Douglas 
Aircraft Company common stock and 25 shares of 
Goodyear Rubber Company stock held by the Bank 
as pledged security on two promissory notes. The 
principal issue raised by this appeal is the applica-
tion of the Statute of Limitations to the plaintiffs 
claimed cause of action. 
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On or about July 10, 1947, Francis B. Goeltz, 
who was then the husband of Marion S. Goeltz, 
plaintiff herein, and who had been for some time 
a customer of The Continental Bank and Trust 
Company borrowed from the Bank the sum of $1,000 
and executed a promissory note in that amount. The 
note also bore the purported signature of Marian S. 
Goeltz, as maker, and there was pledged as security 
for the note 150 shares of The Knickerbocker Fund, 
certificate No. 3670, 10 shares of Commercial Credit 
Company, #CF 67287, and 25 shares of Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company. All of these certificates were 
in the name of Marian S. Goeltz and bor~ her pur-
ported signature in blank on the reverse. The pro-
ceeds of the loan were credited to Mr. Goeltz's ac-
count at the Bank. The loan was renewed in March, 
1948 for the same amount and the same stock certifi-
cates were retained as pledged collateral. The note 
was again renewed in August, 1948, with the same 
stocks as collateral. An additional loan of $500 under 
date of March 20, 1950, was made by the Bank to Mr. 
Goeltz and secured by the same stock collateral. 
Both the renewal note of August, 1948 and the new 
note of March 20, 1950, bore the purported signa-
ture of Marian S. Goeltz, as co-maker. Payments 
were made on both notes so that on December 22, 
1952, the balance on the $1,000 had been reduced 
to $883.08, and the balance on the $500 had been 
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reduced to $215.75. No payments have been received 
since that date. 
The particular stocks which had been pledged 
with the Bank vv-ere the individual property of :rvirs. 
Goeltz and had been held for her at the brokerage 
office of Ure, Pett and Morris, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Francis Bo Goeltz, her husband, had been assisting 
her in the handling of her individual estate and had 
access to that brokerage account. 
In October, 1950, Mrs. Goeltz, by then separated 
from her husband, had changed brokerage houses 
to J. A. Hogle and Con1pany and on the advice of 
Mr. Beck of that company, had determined to sell 
her Knickerbocker Fund and Commercial Credit 
Company stock. At that time she found that the 
stock certificates were not in the possession of Ure, 
Pett and Morris but were in the hands of The Con-
tinental Bank and Trust Company as collateral 
security for the notes. Upon an agreement with Mr. 
W. E. Gile, vice president of the Bank, she substi-
tuted for the stock previously held by the Bank, six 
shares of Douglas Aircraft Company and twenty-
five shares of Goodyear Rubber, which are the sub-
ject of the action, and the other shares were released 
to her. ~~umerous efforts were made by the Bank 
between that time and September 29, 1953, when 
this suit was filed, to obtain payment and the balance 
due on the notes from Mr. Goeltz, but to no avail. 
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In September, 1953, Mrs. Goeltz brought this 
action against the Bani{ for the return of the certi-
ficates. The Bank defended on the ground that they 
had a valid pledge, that the original certificates 
were endorsed in blank by Mrs. Goeltz, thus making 
them fully negotiable, and also asserted laches on 
the part of Mrs. Goeltz. The answer of the Bank 
was not filed until after the deposition of Mrs. Goeltz 
had been taken at which time she stated that the 
certificates which had been originally pledged to the 
Bank had been endorsed by her in blank prior to the 
time they were delivered to Ure, Pett and Morris. 
Also, during the course of that deposition she denied 
that the signatures on the notes were hers. When 
the matter came on for trial, Mrs. Goeltz changed 
her story as to the signatures on one of the stock 
certificates and a recess was taken by the court to 
obtain photostatic copies from the transfer agent 
of all the certificates which had been originally 
pledged with the Bank and later released to Mrs. 
Goeltz for the purpose of examining the signatures 
on the stock certificates. When these certificates 
were produced at the second stage of the trial, it 
was established from the testimony of plaintiff and 
the expert witness introduced by Mrs. Goeltz, that 
the signatures. on two of the stock certificates, i.e. 
the Mountain Fuel Supply Company certificate and 
Commercial Credit certificate, were not, in fact, 
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hers. Whereupon (R. 138) the Bank moved to amend 
its answer and particularly its third defense to al-
lege, in addition to the doctrine of laches, the statute 
of limitations on the ground that the certificate, 
being wrongfully pledged in 1947 by Mr. Goeltz, 
such act constituted a conversion by the Bank as 
well as Mr. Goeltz and that the statute (78-12-
26(2) ) started to run on that date. This motion 
for leave to amend was taken under advisement by 
the trial court and later denied. 
Having denied the defense of the statute of limi-
tations, the court found that both the signatures on 
the promissory notes and the signatures on the stock 
certificates originally pledged with the Bank were 
forged and that the Bank acquired no rights there-
by. Having so determined, the court ordered judg 
ment in favor of the plaintiff for return of such 
stock certificates. 
Defendant Banl{ appeals from this judgment on 
the ground that the court erred in failing to allow 
it to amend and set up the statute of limitations and 
the court failed to apply the doctrine of laches or 
estoppel to plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BANI{. 
II. TI-IE TRIAL COUf~T ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW DEFENDANT BANK TO AMEND ITS 
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ANSWER TO ASSERT THE STATUTE OF LilVIIT A-
TIONS. 
III. PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE PLEDGE OF THE KNICKER-
BOCKER FUND STOCK. 
IV. THE BANK HAD NO NOTICE OF INFIRM-
ITY IN THE KNICKERBOCKER FUND CERTIFICATE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 'rHE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK. 
As this is an action for conversion of personal 
property, the appropriate section of the Statute of 
Limitations is 78-12-26(2) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which fixes the period as three years. The sole 
issue under the facts established is the date on which 
the statute commenced to run. 
It is defendant Bank's position that the wrong-
ful pledge of stolen or converted securities by Fran-
cis B. Goeltz on July 10, 1947, constituted a con-
version by the pledgee as well as by the pledgor and 
started the running of the statute at that time. It is 
well established that in the case of a wrongful pledge 
of stolen or converted property of another, the 
pledgee's position is wrongful from the outset and 
the Statute of Limitations begins to run at once 
against an action for conversion and no subsequent 
demand or refusal can start it afresh. O'Connell v. 
Chicago Park District, 34 N.E. 2d 836, 135 A.L.R. 
698, 376 Ill. 550 ( 1941). This case holds, among 
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other things, that where the pledge is invalid ab init'io 
so that the pledgee's possession is wrongful, the Sta-
tute of Limitations co1nmenced to run at that time 
and the subsequent refusal of the pledgee to release 
the pledged property upon demand of the rightful 
owner does not give rise to a cause of action for con-
version different and distinct from the cause of ac-
tion occasioned by the rnere wrongful possession of 
the pledged property. 
The leading Utah case on the subject, Dee v. 
llyland 3 Utah 308, 3 P. 388 involved a purchase 
rather than a pledge by the defendant, but the prin-
ciple is the sameo As was said by the Supren1e Court 
of the United States in Warner v. Martin, 11 How-
ard, 209, 13 L. Ed. 667: 
"A factor or agent who has power to sell 
the produce of his principal has no povver to 
affect the property by tortiously pledging it 
as security or satisfaction for a debt of his 
own, and it is of no consequence that the 
pledgee is ignorant of the factor's not being 
the ovvner. Paterson v. Tash, Str. 1178; Maans 
v. Henderson, 1 East, 337; Newson v. Thorn-
ton, 6 East, 17; 2 Smith 207; McCombie v. 
Davies, 6 Eeast, 538; 7 East, 5; Daubigny v. 
Duval, 5 T.R. 604; 1 Maule & Selw, 140, 147; 
2 Stark. 539; Guichard v. Morgan, 4 Moore, 
36; 2 Brod. & Bingh. 639; 5 Ves. Jun. 213. 
\Vhen goods are so pledged or disposed of, 
the principal may recover them back by an 
action of trover against the pawnee, without 
tendering to the factor vvhat may be due to 
him, and vvithout any tender to the pawnee of 
the sum for whjch the goods were pledged 
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(Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T.R. 604); or without 
any demand of such goods ( 6 East, 538; 12 
Mod.) and it is no excuse that the pawnee 
was wholly ignorant that he who held the 
goods held them as a mere agent or factor 
(Martine 1. Coles, 1 Maule & Selw. 140), un-
less, indeed, where principal ( 6 Maule & Selw. 
147). 
In Dee v. Hyland, supra this court said: 
''Which of these parties, plaintiff or de-
fen.dant, both innocent and without fault, 
must be the loser? 
* * * 
"Does the fact that the plaintiff did not 
know who had the horse, nor where it was 
affect the rights of either party to this action, 
as to the statute of limitations pleaded as a 
bar? The statute contains no exception ex-
empting plaintiffs, who are ignorant of the 
facts necessary to give them a right of action 
from its limitations, and there is none im-
plied by law unless that ignorance is occa-
sioned by some improper conduct of the defen-
dant. * * * Where there is no proof of fraud 
on the part of the defendant, the general rule 
is that the time of limitation runs from the 
time of the commission of the wrong/ttl act, 
or the right of action accrues, and not from 
the time of the knowledge of the act by the 
plaintiff, there being no proof of any wrong-
ful conduct on the part of the defendant by 
means of which that knowledge is concealed 
from the plaintiff." (emphasis supplied) 
To the same effect are Williams v. Harper Bros. 
Automobile Dealers, Okla~ 27.6 P. 2d 217 (1954) 
and Bennett v. Meeker, Mont. 202 P. 204. There is 
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no question or claim in this case that The Continent-
al Bank in accepting the pledge of the property was 
other than in good faith. As this Court has stated, 
and it is the well recognized majority rule, ignor-
ance of the plaintiff in such situation does not pre-
vent the Statute from running. Falls Branch Coal 
Co. v. Proctor Coal Co. 203 Ky. 307~ 262 S.W. 300 
37 A.L.R. 1172; Industrial Chrome Plating Co. v. 
North, (Oreg. 1944), 153 P: 2d 835, 156 A.L.R.-250; 
International Agr. Corp. v. Lockhart, 188 S. E. 243 
(S. C.). See ·annotation in 136 ALR, 658. 
II. TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW DEFENDANT BANI( TO AMEND ITS 
ANSWER TO ASSERT THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS. 
It being clear that the claim of the plaintiff is 
barred by the statute of limitations, it is equally 
clear that the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
defendant Bank to amend its answer to set forth 
expressly that defense. 
The case first came on for trial on October 29, 
1954. At that hearing plaintiff Marian S. Goeltz 
testified that the three stock certificates which had 
been originally pledged to the Bank by her husband 
with her signature in blank thereon, were her own 
property and they had been placed by her with Ure, 
Pett and Morris since 1945. She also testified that 
the Knickerbocker Fund and the Commercial Credit 
stock certificates had been endorsed in blank by her 
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when she placed them with the brokerage firm ( R. 
48), but that the Mountain Fuel Supply certificate 
had not been so endorsed (R.50, 61). As she had 
previously testified in her deposition (p. 5, 22) that 
she had endorsed all three certificates, the trial court 
continued the hearing until the certificates in ques-
tion, which Mrs. Goeltz had in the meantime sold, 
could be obtained from the transfer agent for the 
respective companies. At the second hearing on Jan-
uary 19, 1955, Mrs. Goeltz (R. 135) and the signa-
ture expert (R. 138) established that the signatures 
on not only the Mountain Fuel, but also the Commer-
cial Credit certificates were forged. Thereupon de-
fendant Bank (R. 138) moved to amend its answe1 
to assert the statute of limitations to conform to the 
evidence produced by the plaintiff at the second 
hearing. The position of the bank was stated by its 
conusel in open court at the time the motion for leave 
to amend was made, as follows: 
"MR. BILLINGS. I would like leave at 
this time, I sort of anticipated that this is 
what the evidence would be, and since our 
last recess I would like leave at this time to 
amend our answer to conform to the evidence 
which has been adduced here today. We had 
originally set up as our third defense the Doc-
trine of Laches, that is that Mrs. Goeltz was 
on notice as early as 1947 that her husband 
was playing around with her stock as she tes-
tified. Now we want leave to express the Sta-
tute of Limitations as the evidence shows that 
10 
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this stock was originally pledged in 1946. The 
notes that are in evedence and the testimony 
was that they are renewals, they are dated 
1947 and 1950, and since that they were for-
geries from the beginning that was an unlaw-
ful pledge, he had no authority to pledge 
them, and the cause of action arose with the 
pledge and not at any subsequent date and so 
that the statute whether you take the three 
year statute for the refusal to deliver person-
ally property the conversion of the personal 
property which the pledge would be in 1947, 
1946 or the fourth year, the statute acts as 
not otherwise provided by law either one of 
the statutes would have run before this action 
was filed in 1953." ( R. 138) 
"MR. BILLINGS: Well, I briefed it some-
,,. what myself and I have no objection. The 
point is, Your Honor, we took Mrs. Goeltz's 
deposition and at the time she testified that 
she had signed them and we set up our de-
fense that we were bona fide pledgees for 
value, now we come and get the certificates 
and find that they were forgeries. We didn't 
know it until we got the certificates." (R. 
140) 
Under Rule 15 (a) "leave to amend shall be free-
ly given when justice so requires. 
As stated in Moore's Federal Practice, Second 
Edition, § 15: 
''The courts have shown a 'strong libera-
lity .. .in allowing amendments under Rule 
15 (a)' * * * For example, the defendant may 
be permitted to amend his answer to set up an 
additional defense* * * 
ll 
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"Allowance of an1endments lies in the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and refusal to per-
mit amendment is 11ot subject to review on 
appeal except for abuse of discretion. Never-
theless the courts are required to allow amend-
ments freely, and refusal should be placed 
on some valid ground, as that the party has 
had a sufficient opportunity to state a claim 
and has failed, or that the amendment is not 
offered in good faith, or will result in preju-
dice. It has been said that the fact that an 
amendment is insufficient in law is not a 
ground for refusing leave to file it. But the 
court may, if it sees fit, deny leave. If the 
amendment would be. subject to a motion to 
dismiss, it would be an idle move for the court 
to allow the amendment, and refusal to grant 
leave to amend in such a case has been held 
no abuse of discretion. 
"Laches and delay may, of course, bar a 
. proposed amendment. The mere fact that an 
amendment is offered late in the case is, how-
ever, not enough to bar it; amendments may 
be offered at the trial, or even after reversal 
and remand.'' 
It is stated that the mere fact that an amend-
ment is offered late in the case is not enough to bar 
it and refusal to allow such amendment is an abuse 
of discretion. Lloyd v. United Liquor Corp. 203 F. 
2d 789 (C. A. -6, 1953). The-important factor is 
v;hetl1er any prejudice will result which cannot be 
eliminated by the conditions attached to the grant-
ing the motion. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Patterso11 
Sgt. Co. 10 F.R.D. 534. 
12 
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It is subn1itted that the situation in the case at 
bar clearly appears a proper one to allow the motion 
to an1end the answer. This court recognized the 
propriety of such a motion long before the liberal 
rules of civil procedure patterned on the Federal 
Rules were adopted and allowed amendment to as-
sert the statute of limitations when it constitutes 
a valid defense. Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 
Utah 426, 73 P. 2d 1277. 
In the case at bar, the defendant had filed its 
answer only after taking of the plaintiff's deposi-
tion and had relied on her statement that all three 
stock certificates had been signed in blank by her 
in setting forth its defenses. Plaintiff was the only 
one who could know the true facts as to her signa-
tures. The certificates being signed in blank were 
negotiated to Defendant Bank and the Bank could 
rely on its position as a bona fide pledgee for value 
under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, (Title 16, 
Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953). It was 
not until the trial, and, indeed, until the second 
hearing that the true facts came out that the signa-
tures on two of the stock certificates were forged. 
Defendant Bank had already plead laches and the 
only change by the amendment was a specific refer-
ence to the statute of limitations. Plaintiff was in 
no vvay prejudiced by the proposed amend1nenL 
Counsel for defendant did not press the court to rule 
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immediately, but agreed that plaintiff might have 
time to brief the issue. (R. 140). 
As stated in 34 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions, 
§ 447, generally a defendant will be permitted to 
amend to _set up the bar of the statute of limitations 
wh~re such procedure appears to be justified in the 
mind of the court as being in furtherance of justice, 
such a plea being said to be one to the merits. See 
statement of the ·south Dakota Court in F. M. Slagle 
& Co. v. Bushnell. 16 N.W. 2d 914. 
''By th-e aid of such counsel the defense 
has gained in favor. It has been said that the 
statute of limitations should not be discri-
minated against but should be treated like 
any:_ other defense. Thomas et al. v. Price, 33 
Wash 459, 74 P. 563, 99 Am. St. Rep. 961. 
This court has held it to be a meritorious de-
fen~ and has affirmed a ruling allowing it 
to be set up by amendment. Houts et al. v. 
Bartle et al., 14 SD 322, 85 NW 591. That 
ruling accords with the overwhelming weight 
of authority. 34 Am Jur. 350; Walters v. 
Webster, 52 Colo. 549, 123 P. 952, Ann. Cas. 
1914 A 24. See Wrightson v. Dougherty, 5 
Cal 2d 257, 54 P. 2d 13, and Davenport v. 
Stratton (Cal. Sup. 149 P. 2d 4." 
It cannot be disputed that the proposed amend-
ment sets up a valid defense and was made as soon 
as the facts were developed indicating the existence 
of such a defense. Defendant Bank was not guilty 
of any laches in asserting the defense, nor of any 
attempt to surprise plaintiff. Full opportunity was 
14 
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given to plaintiff to meet the issue. As stated by 
this court in Hayden v. Collins, 90 Utah, 238, 63 
P. 2d 223, 225: 
"* * * The defendent has been brought 
into court and made to defend. Any set of 
facts which he may set up, whether sounding 
in contract or in tort and which tend to de-
feat the claim of the plaintiff, is permitted. 
And if he should, for the time, fail to set up 
some facts which would constitute an affirm-
ative defense or counterclaim and then later 
conclude that these facts would constitute a 
good counterclaim or defense, he should be 
able to do so as long as they are not advanced 
as such a late day as to make the tardiness 
prejudicial to the plaintiff. * * *" 
It is sub1nitted that if the bar of the statute of 
limitations is a valid defense, justice requires al-
lowing the amendment to assert it. To deny justice 
is to abuse discretion. As this court has heretofore 
held, when the proposed amendment sets up a valid 
defense or counterclaim, it is prejudicial error to 
refuse to allow the amendment. Detroit Vapor Stove 
Co. v. J. C. Weeter L~tmber Co. 61 Utah 503 (1923) 
215 P. 995. 
Quite aside from Rule 15 (a) is Rule 15 (b) 
which is the express basis upon which defendant 
Bank sought to assert the statute of limitations. In 
llaslcins v. Rasberry, 119 F. 2d 803 (C. A. 9, 1941), 
the Ninth Circuit construed Federal Rule 15 (b) 
from which our own rule is taken to include the 
15 
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statute of limitations as a defense when facts were 
proven to show its application. In that case, suit 
was commenced to quiet title. As here, the defend-
ant pleaded laches, but not expressly the statute 
of limitations. The trial court ruled that the Nevada 
statute applied and dismissed the action. On appeal, 
plaintiff-appellant contended that the statute of 
limitations should have been affirmatively pleaded. 
With respect to this court's opinion at p. 805 stated: 
"Appelant's only argument regarding ap-
pellee's contention that the cause is barred, is 
that appellees waived the defense by failure 
to plead it, because Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 8 (c) 28 U.S.C.A. following 
section 733c, requires the statute of limita-
tions to be affirmatively pleaded. Appellees 
contend that the rule was complied with. We 
think it unnecessary to decide whether the 
pleading is sufficient, because Rule 15 (b) dis-
poses of the contention in any event. That 
rule provides in part : 'When iss11es not raised 
bythe pleadings are tried by express or im-
plied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause 
them to conform to the evidence and to raise 
these issues may be made upon motion of any 
party at any time, even after judgment; fail-
ure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues * * *' 
"We think and hold that the statute above 
quoted bars the remedy invoked by appellant." 
It is submftted therefore, that if the statute of 
16 
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limitations constitutes a valid defense for the action 
to recover stock certificates wrongfully pledged in 
1946, Rule 15 (b) requires its application. The case 
was originally tried on the theory, based on Mrs. 
Goeltz's deposition, that the cause of action did not 
arise until 1950 when she demanded her stocks and 
later 1nade a substitution under a nonwaiver agree-
n1ent. It was only after it was learned that the 
stock had been stolen and pledged with forged signa-
tures that the application of the statute of limita-
tions to the wrongful pledge as early as 1946, be-
came apparent. Plaintiff not only was on notice of 
the situation and "suspicious" (R. 79) as early as 
1947, but waited until 1950 to ascertain the true 
situation as to her stocks supposedly with Ure, Pett 
and Morris ( 180), and another three years to file 
suit. It is hard to find any prejudice to the plaintiff 
in the defendant's failure to set forth laches or the 
statute of limitations. Rather, the denial of such 
defense is prejudicial to defendant Bank. 
III. PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE PLEDGE OF THE KNICKER-
BOCKER FUND STOCK. 
Despite plaintiff's inconsistent testimony as to 
her endorsements of the other stock certificates, she 
has al\vays admitted that the endorsement on the 
Knickerbocker Fund certificate was genuine and 
that it was so endorsed by her at the time she de-
livered it to her brokers. The facts are also undis-
17 
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puted that plaintiff's husband had access to this ac-
count and that he did, with plaintiff's knowledge, 
direct the purchase and sale of the plaintiff's secur-
ities. This is clearly shown from the record. 
"Q. But, as a matter of fact, he did have 
access to these stocks that were at Ure, Pett 
and Morris, did he not? 
A. Just because he happens to know Mr. 
Morris, I guess, and no one questioned his 
going in there. 
Q. But he did have access to them? 
A. Apparently he must have had access 
or he couldn't take them out. 
Q. In fact, he took and sold a great many 
of them. 
A. Yes, in the end he sold a great 
amount. But he sold them to Ure, Pett and 
Morris and din't take them out of Ure, Pett 
and Morris that I know of. 
Q. But at least as far as Ure, Pett and 
Morris were concerned, he would come in and 
take certificates out and put them in, is that 
right? 
A. You will have to ask Ure, Pett and 
Morris that because I ha dnothing to do with 
it. 
THE COURT: Let me see, Mrs. Goeltz. 
Did Ure, Pett and Morris sell those stocks 
of yours upon Mr. Goeltz telling them to? 
A. If Mr. Goeltz told them to when I was 
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THE COURT: Well, would they do it 
without a letter from you to him authorizing 
"t? 1 . 
A. Yes, they would. Strange to say. 
THE COURT: In other words, they let 
him handle your account? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: And did you authorize 
them to let him handle your account. 
A. I havenever given them any authori-
zation; any formal authorization. 
THE COURT : You knew they were be-
ing handled by him? 
A. I knew that at times when Frank 
would tell Spide to buy this or sell that 
THE COURT: For You? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew then that Frank was buy-
ing and selling your stocks, at least selling 
them at Ure, Pett and Morris and they were 
honoring his orders? 
A. I think that is putting it broadly, Mr. 
Billings. He was not buying them. 
Q. Or selling them. 
A. He would tell Spide and, of course, 
they would be sold in my name or bout in my 
name." ( R. p. 63-64) 
It is well established that where an owner has 
endorsed a stock certificate and gives access and 
power to dispose of it to a third party for a certain 
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limited purpose, and such third party in fact ex-
ceeds his authority and sells or pledges such stock 
to an innocent person without notice of such limita-
tion of authority, the owner is estopped from as-
serting title as against the innocent purchaser (See 
73 A.L.R. 1405). 
This court has stated this rule several times. 
Thus, in Garfield Banking Co. v. Argyle et al 64 
Utah 572 (1924) 232 P. 541, the owner of a certifi-
cate of stock endorsed it in blank and made it acces-
sible to Argyle for a limited purpose. In violation 
of this restriction, Argyle pledged the stock for his 
own purposes. This court stated: 
!_ 
"* * *When she indorsed her stock certifi-
cate in blank and delivered it to the defendant 
Argyle, she invested him with all the indicia 
of title and ownership, and, if he abused the 
confidence reposed in him and appellant suf-
fered a loss, she, and not the plaintiff, must 
bear such loss. Appellant, according to her 
own testimony, indorsed the certificate in 
blank and delivered it to Argyle to procure a 
loan of money. True, she says that the loan 
was to be for a special purpose and for a limit-
ed amount. If that be so it cannot avail her as 
against plaintiff for the reason that she fail-
ed to limit Argyle's power and right to dis-
pose of the certificate in such form as to 
impart notice to one dealing with the certifi-
cate in good faith. The finding of the court is 
that neither of the banks who loaned money 
upon the certificate had any notice or knowl-
edge of any limitation of power so far as 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Argyle was concerned. In view of that, there-
fore, the equities of the plaintiff are superior 
to those of the appellant." at p. 542. 
In Adaras v. Silver Shield Min. & Mill. Co. et al 
(1933)- 82 Utah 586, 21 P. 2d 886, this court stated 
the general principle of this rule quite clearly, al-
though in that particular case, it was held that the 
subsequent transferee vv-as not a holder for value and 
thus did not co1ne vv-ithin the general rule. The 
court stated: 
"It has almost universally been held by 
the courts that, while a certificate of stock is 
not a neg·otiable instrument, an owner of such 
stock vvho intrusts another with his stock 
certificate indorsed or signed in blank clothes 
the party to whom the certificate is intrusted 
with such indicia of ownership that an un-
authorized sale or pledge of the certificate by 
the latter to an innocent purchaser or pledgee 
for value is binding upon the true owner and 
prevents him fro1n asserting a paramount 
interest in the shares. See long list of cases in 
the note in 73 A.L.R. 1407. Most of the cases 
say that the rights of the bona fide holder as 
against the true owner do not depend on the 
proposition that the stock certificates are neg-
otiable paper, but rest in estoppel upon the 
thf-~ory that one who has conferred upon an-
other, by indorsement and delivery of the 
stock certificate, all indicia of ownership of 
the property is estopped to assert title to it 
as against a third person who has purchased 
it foi" value, in good faith, from the apparent 
owner. It is sometimes said that, where one 
of t-vvo innocent people n111st suff()r, the true 
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owner or the innocent purchaser, the owner, 
by delivering the certificate indorsed in blank, 
has enabled the third party to perpetuate the 
wrong and therefore should be estopped fron1 
asserting his ownership." 
Of course, it is not even necessary under this 
undisputed rule, to prove plaintiff's husband was 
clothed with indicia of title. ·The court need never 
reach that step, for it is even clearer that plaintiff's. 
broker was clothed with such indicia when plain-
tiff endorsed the certificate of her original portfolio 
in blank and placed them with her broker for more 
expeditious trading. 
Thus, in Re Mcintyre, (1910), 181 F. 955, the 
court held that one who deposited a certificate of 
stock endorsed in blank with his broker exposes him-
self to the risk of losing his stock on the basis of es-
soppel if the broker improperly pledged it to a third 
party who, in turn, sold it. 
In Citizens Bank v. Mutual Trust and Deposit 
Co. (1924, Ky.) 266 S.W. 875, 40 A.L.R. 1001, the 
court held that a person placing stock signed in 
blank, together with a power of attorney, in the 
hands of his broker must bear the loss of the wrong-
ful pledge of the stock to a third party for his own 
debts. See also Elliott v. Miller, 158 Fed. 868 ( 1908), 
Hazard v. Powell, (1926, Ohio), 154 N.E. 357. 
The record is silent as to how plaintiff's husband 
acquired possession of the Knickerbocker certificatr .. 
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It is certain, however, that it had been delivered 
and endorsed in blank to plaintiff's broker, and it 
must have been an act of plaintiff's broker which 
placed the certificate in circulation. Whether the 
certificate was deliverd to the Bank by plaintiff's 
husband or by any other third party, would not pre-
clude operation of the rule, because plaintiff's acts 
with regard to her broker could create the estoppel 
independently of any authorization given her hus-
band. The fact that the delivery was made by plain-
tiff's husband merely strengthens the applicability 
of the rule because ( 1) we have a course of con-
duct whereby the transferee from the broker was 
also given control over the disposition of the stock, 
thereby creating an additional ground for plaintiff's 
estoppel, and (2) the relationship of husband and 
wife vvould make it even less likely that the bank 
would question the transaction than if it were any 
other party. 
With theses facts in mind, it is clear that the 
trial court erred in failing to find plain tiff estopped 
by her own conduct from asserting title to the 
Knickerbocker Fund certificate. 
IV. TI-IE BANI{ HAD NO NOTICE OF INFIRM-
ITY IN THE KNICKERBOCKER FUND CERTIFICATE. 
The trial court has found that there was no 
agency between plaintiff and her husband (Finding 
of Faet No. 7, R. 147) and that the Bank had notice 
2') ._) 
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of this absence. (Finding of Fact No. 14, R. 148). 
Whether there was or was not such a relation-
ship has no necessary bearing on the rights of the 
bank, with regard to the Knickerbocker Fund certi-
ficate. (If the relationship of principal-agent did ex-
ist between plaintiff and her husband, the banl{'s 
rights would, of course, be even stronger, but the 
absence of the relationship is not fa tal to it) . 
The Bank is not contending that it dealt with 
plaintiff's ht1sband in any capacity but as a princi-
pay. The Bank contends, and there is no evidence 
to disprove this, that it treated the pledged stocks 
as that of plaintiff's husband. In fact, the record 
shows without dispute that the loan was made to 
Mr. Goeltz alone on the security of the stocks which 
were all apparently his (as they were endorsed in 
blank so as to be in street form), the proceeds of 
the loan were credited to Mr. Goeltz's individual ac-
count at the Bank (Ex. 5) and carried on the ledger 
card in his name alone (Ex. 7). The Bank merely 
urges that regardless of agency, plaintiff, by endors-
ing the Knickerbocker Fund certificate and clothing 
her broker and her husband with indicia of owner-
ship, is estopped to assert her title as against the 
Bank (see supra). 
Thus, as the existence of agency between plain-
tiff and her husband is not essential to the estab-
lishment of tl1e bank's case , the fact of notice or 
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non-notice of its existence is irrelevant. 
The sole relevancy of notice with regard to the 
Knickerbocker Fund would be as to whether the 
Bank took it with notice of plaintiff's improper pos-
session of this particular certificate. There is no 
finding by the trial court to this effect. 
Finding of fact No. 14 (R. 148) states, some-
what vaguely that defendant "was charged with 
notice of forgery of plaintiff's name" on the other 
certificates and promissory notes and "was bound 
by said notice or knowledge as to all stocks herein 
involved." vVhat the nature or basis of such "notice" 
is we cannot determine from the findings and we 
submit that it cannot be found from the record. 
It was not until over four years after the pledge 
that plaintiff commenced her claim against the 
Bank. There is not even an allegation of actual notice 
by officers of the Bank of any infirmity in the 
Knickerbocker Fund certificate before this. (See 
com plaint, R. 1-3) . Nor are there any findings as 
to constructive notice as to the Knickerbocker Fund 
certificate. What the court meant by "notice" and 
how it bound the Bank "as to all stocks" remains 
unexplained. 
The sole possible basis for this finding is shown 
by certain statements made in colloquy between the 
court and counsel ( R. 127-128). It was there sug-
gested that if the forgeries on the other certificates 
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(which at that time were not available as evidence) 
were of such obvious and flagrant nature that any 
reasonable and prudent man would know that they 
could not have been made by the sa1ne person as. 
the original signature on the Knickerbocker Fund 
certificate, the Bank might have been placed on no-
tice of some irregularity in all the certificates. 
The court made no finding on this question. In-
deed, a comparison of the signatures on the three 
certificates (see exhibits 14, 15 & 16) even when 
removed from the documents and placed side by side, 
shows no dissimilarity marked enough to place a 
man of affairs on notice that the certificates were 
all not properly endorsed. 
This assumes, of course, that a patent dissimi-
larity would be notice of invalidity. Even this is not 
necessarily the case. A patently dissimilar signa-
ture could well have been made with the owner's 
authorization and might be perfectly valid and bind-
ing. (In the instant case, this was not true, but it 
would not affect the question of notice which ulti-
mately rests on reasonableness. O'Reilly v. McLean, 
84 Utah 551, 37 P. 2d 770. 
Thus, whatever the extent of the Bank's rights 
as to the other certificates, it is clear that there can 
be no "contamination" by this of its rights as to the 
Knickerbocker Fund certificate, where estoppel of 
plaintiff clearly applies. The court has made no find-
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ing of notice as to absence of authority to deal with 
this particular certificate. Nor, it is submitted, 
would the facts of record justify such a finding. The 
validity of the pledge of each certificate must turn 
on its own facts and on this basis, Plaintiff is pre-
cluded from asserting rights as to the Knickerbock-
er Fund stock. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing. it is submitted that 
plaintiff's claim against the Bank is barred by the 
statute of limitations, and by reason thereof, the 
judgment below should be reversed and judgment 
entered for the Bank, no cause of action. 
It is further submitted that even if the statute 
of limitations be not applicable, the Bank is a law-
ful pledgee of the Knickerbocker Fund certificate. 
The plaintiff having received $816.00 net from the 
sale thereof in 1950, the Bank is entitled to 
that amount from plaintiff before it can be required 
to deliver the certificates of Douglas Aircraft and 
Goodyear Rubber stock now held by it in lieu thereof. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
Fabian, Clendenin, Moffat & Mabey 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Salt IJake City, Utah 
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